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ABSTRACT 
The Insurance Companies (Ratings and Inspections) Act 1994 ("the Ratings 
Act") introduced a disclosure based regime for non-life insurers. Unlike 
other such regimes there may be scope for judicial review. This is because 
the regime directly or indirectly empowers certain decision-makers: the 
Registrar of Companies, the Insurance Council and the two Rating 
Agencies which have been appointed and which prepare the ratings . This 
is not, however, an orthodox statutory regulatory regime. It is rather a 
regime which keeps direct government involvement to a minimum and 
relies on the expertise of a self-regulatory association (the Council) and the 
commercial regulatory power of international commercial rating agencies. 
Such a regime challenges the very foundations of judicial review. 
This paper examines the ratings regime and sets it in the context of the 
way in which our society is ordered. It compares this pluralist ordering 
with the idea of the unitary state which is the underlying basis for judicial 
review. It examines the way in which the courts have dealt with 
regulatory power which challenges this conception of the state: 
particularly regulation by private bodies and the use of contract as a 
regulatory tool. It then illustrates the difficulties which arise by applying 
the case law to the decision-makers under the ratings regime. It concludes 
that judicial revew needs to develop new principles which recognise first, 
that society is pluralist and second, that contract is frequently used as a 
regulatory tool. 
WORD LENGTH 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes and bibliography) 
comprises approximately 12,100 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Broadly speaking, financial services comprise insurance and investment 
services Many consumers of such services do not have the expertise to 
judge either: the solvency or bona £ides of the provider of the investment 
product; or the merits of the various products on offer. For this reason, 
financial services have been subjected to various forms of regulation both 
in New Zealand and overseas. These include self-regulation (with or 
without a statutory overlay), licensing and compulsory disclosure regimes. 
Where a public body licences or regulates a service, there is clear scope for 
judicial review. But where a service is regulated by means of compulsory 
disclosure of information there is generally no such scope: the provider 
discloses the required information and the consumer is free to decide 
whether or not to buy the service in question. Thus the "market" 
regulates the service. This form of regulation has found particular favour 
in New Zealand. It fits in with the free-market philosophies current in 
New Zealand since 1984; it is also perceived as being simple and cheap. 
The Insurance Companies (Ratings and Inspections) Act 1994 ("the Ratings 
Act") introduced a disclosure based regime for non-life insurers. Unlike 
other such regimes there may be scope for judicial review. This is because 
the regime directly or indirectly empowers certain decision-makers: the 
Registrar of Companies, the Insurance Council and the two Rating 
Agencies which have been appointed and which prepare the ratings . This 
is not, however, an orthodox statutory regulatory regime. It is rather a 
regime which keeps direct government involvement to a minimum and 
relies on the expertise of a self-regulatory association (the Council) and the 
commercial regulatory power of international commercial rating agencies. 
Such a regime challenges the very foundations of judicial review. 
This paper examines the ratings regime and sets it in the context of the 
way in which our society is ordered. It compares this pluralist ordering 
with the idea of the unitary state which is the underlying basis for judicial 
review. It examines the way in which the courts have dealt with 
regulatory power which challenges this conception of the state: 
particularly regulation by private bodies and the use of contract as a 
regulatory tool. It then illustrates the difficulties which arise by applying 
the case law to the decision-makers under the ratings regime. Some 
conclusions are then set out. 
More specifically this paper is structured as follows. Part II discusses the 
Brash report and sets out the reasons for regulating insurance and the 
theoretical foundations of the ratings regime. Part III examines the 
Ratings Act and part IV the decision-makers empowered by it. In part VI 
examine the agreements between each of the two rating agencies and the 
Council parts of which are deemed to form part of agreements reached 
between the rating agencies and the insurers. Part VI of the paper sets the 
ratings regime in context: the foundations of judicial review are discussed 
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and found to be wanting both in terms of the way in which society is 
ordered in general and against the ratings regime in particular. In part VII 
I discuss cases which illustrate the difficulties which arise when the courts 
are confronted with regulatory strategies which involve non-
governmental bodies. Part VIII concerns the approach of the courts to 
contract when it is used as a regulatory tool. The amenability to review of 
each of the decisions-makers involved in the ratings regime is the subject 
of part IX and my conclusions are set out in part X. 
The questions discussed do have a practical application. Insurers will be 
appreciably affected by the level of their ratings and have no right of 
appeal under the Ratings Act and only limited rights under the 
agreements between them and the rating agencies. The decisions of the 
Council and/ or the agencies may be illegal, irrational or unfair1 and the 
insurer affected may wish to have terms of the agreement declared invalid 
or a decision quashed. There is also possible that consumer groups may 
wish to challenge aspects of the regime, or particular ratings. 
II THE BRASH REPORT 
A Why Regulate the Insurance Sector? 
People rely on insurance to protect themselves against events which are 
unlikely to occur but may have serious consequences if they do. If, for 
example, a major earthquake occurs in New Zealand the value of claims 
made on insurers will be huge. A failure by insurers to meet those claims 
will result in individual suffering and severe consequences could ensue 
for the whole New Zealand economy. 
Major disasters occur infrequently. An insurer which covers, say, 
earthquake and fire damage may not be called upon to pay out significant 
sums for many years. Therefore, an unscrupulous or imprudent insurer 
may carry on business with insufficient funds for many years gambling on 
the unlikelihood of serious disaster. When a disaster occurs it is, of 
course, too late to do anything about the insurer's lack of funds. 
Assessing what are "sufficient funds" is, however, not straitforward. It 
would be unreasonable to require an insurer to have funds sufficient to 
meet the insured value of every policy issued by it: only a small 
proportion of that amount may have to be paid out in any one year. The 
funds required will depend on the nature of the business written by the 
insurer and other factors. Only an expert can work this out. The accounts 
of an insurer may not be a reliable guide. 
B Pre-1993 State Regulation of Insurers 
1The three principal grounds for judicial review. See Council of Civil Seroice Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Seroice [1984] 3 All ER 935 per Lord Diplock. Webster v Auckland 
Harbour Board [1987] 2 NZLR 129. 
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For the reasons outlined above, it is common for governments to regulate 
the insurance sector and/ or to protect insureds against the insurer 
insolvencies.2 Until 1993, the only state regulation specific to insurers was 
under the Insurance Companies Deposits Act 1995. The Act requires 
insurers commencing business in New Zealand to pay deposits to the 
Public Trustee. Since 1974 the deposit required has been $500,000 and prior 
to that the amounts were substantially less.3 
New Zealand did not provide insureds with protection against insurer 
insolvencies. However, the Earthquake and War Damage Act 19444 
provided for a system of limited state insurance administered by the 
Earthquake and War Damage Commission. Broadly, the Act provided 
that any property insured under a contract of fire insurance was 
automatically insured under the Act for earthquake and war damage.5 In 
1993 this Act was repealed. The Commission continues to exist under the 
Earthquake Commission Act 1993 but its future role is restricted to natural 
disasters affecting residential property and to a maximum amount of 
$100,000 per dwelling.6 
C The Report 
1 The case for regulation 
The imminent repeal of the Earthquake and War Damage Act prompted 
the Minister of Justice to instruct Dr Brash and Mr McLean in 1993 to 
prepare a report on whether insurance companies and reinsurers carrying 
on business in New Zealand should be required to "obtain and maintain a 
satisfactory rating from a private sector rating agency".7 The Brash Report 
concludes that there is a strong case for regulation of the industry given its 
peculiar features and the position which government might otherwise 
find itself in following a major disaster.8 Other relevant factors were the 
relatively high risk of earthquakes in New Zealand, the fact that much of 
New Zealand insurance is placed with offshore insurers and the limited 
regulation of the insurance sector following the repeal of the 1944 Act.9 
2A Prudential Regime for Insurance Companies: Brash/McLean Report on the Insurance 
Companies Deposits Act 1953, 1993 ("the Brash Report")!. 
35 4(1)(a) of the Act. See J McDermott "The Insurance Deposits Act 1955: A legal audit" 
(1995) 25 VUWLR 499,500. The deposit can be paid by giving security and the income from 
the deposit accrues to the depositor. 
4 See Reprinted Statutes Vol. 6, 207. 
5The Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944, s 14. 
6Earthquake Commission Act 1993, s 18. 
7See above n 2, 1. Dr Donald Brash is and was the head of the Reserve Bank and one 
assumes he was selected because of his knowledge of prudential regimes in the banking 
sector (see discussion of the registration system for banks operated by the Reserve Bank at p 
3 of the Brash Report). Ian McLean is a former National Member of Parliament (Tarawera) 
and was the Commissioner under the Earthquake and War Damage Act 1944. 
8The Brash Report, 3-5. 
9Above, 7. 
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2 Regulatory options 
Time constraints are said to have precluded wide consultation10 and 
different regulatory options are only briefly discussed.11 A system of state 
licensing of insurers such as exists in other countries was preferred by the 
Insurance Council.12 Although two benefits of state licensing are briefly 
noted,13 this option is dismissed without further discussion because it 
would create a public expectation that government will stand behind a 
failed insurer14 and does not provide the "ordinary consumer" with 
information on the insurer's financial status.1 5 State guarantees of 
payment of certain types of claim are dismissed on similar grounds and 
because they burden the tax-payer.16 
A private sector rating agency is preferred by Brash & McLean principally 
because it enables consumers to make an informed choice.1 7 Further 
reasons are given for regulation by the private sector rather than the 
public sector: the government would be perceived to have less of a moral 
obligation to compensate policyholders;18 the private sector will be more 
efficient because of competition from other agencies and the need to 
maintain reputation; and the private sector is said to be able to attract 
skilled staff due to higher rates of pay. A practical reason given is that 
private sector agencies will have world-wide expertise which will enable 
them to assess better the status of insurers operating in New Zealand but 
with overseas reinsurers or parents. It is also asserted that a threat by a 
private agency to downgrade a rating where an insurer refuses to supply 
information is likely to be more effective than a public sector agency's 
threat of legal action over non-compliance. 
10Above, 1. 
11 Above. Representatives of the Insurance Council, senior Department of Justice Officials, 
a Deputy Commissioner involved in Australian insurance regulation and a representative of 
a rating agency were consulted in the course of preparing the Report. Information was 
obtained concerning regulatory regimes in the United Kingdom and Canada and on an 
attempted non-compulsory rating regime in South Africa. 
12Above, 8. It was noted that such regimes exist in Australia, United Kingdom, Canada 
and certain states in the USA and typically have several elements: Insurers must be 
approved; minimum standards must be met; where claims paying ability is in doubt, 
insurers are subject to detailed inspection; and firms which are found to be insolvent are put 
into a process which ensures an orderly exit (see Brash Report p 2). 
l3 Above, 10. First they "can be tied in with the general law and procedures for the 
supervision of companies" and secondly, the state can have access to "the world-wide 
informal network of government regulators". The first "advantage" is difficult to follow. 
Insurance companies are subject to such law in any event and companies are not subject, of 
course, to systems of state licensing and supervision of the sort being discussed. 
14Above, 8. 
15Above, 9. 
16Above, 6. 
17 Above, 9 & 11. 
18 Above, 10 & 11. 
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3 Brash and McLean's recommendations 
Brash and McLean recommend that all fire and general insurers and any 
other insurers writing disaster insurance in New Zealand be required to 
obtain and maintain a credit rating from an approved private sector rating 
agency.19 Insurers would be obliged to disclose their rating before a new 
policy is written and on proposals, renewal and expiry notices.20 Any 
downgrading of a rating should be made public and all rating reports 
should be made available to the public and the ministry of justice.21 The 
regime should have a statutory base but its details should be worked out in 
conjunction with the insurance industry.22 The capital and deposit 
requirements relating to insurers should cease23 and there should be no 
special inspection or insolvency regime for insurers.24 
It is recommended that only one rating agency be appointed and that this 
should be on the basis of its strength in rating insurers in Australasia and 
world-wide.25 The appointment should be made by the Secretary of Justice 
on the recommendation of the Insurance Council which was thought 
likely to be co-operative. To avoid monopoly pricing it was recommended 
that the Council negotiate the contract price.26 
ill THE INSURANCE COMPANIES (RATINGS AND INSPECTIONS) 
ACT 1994 
A Introduction 
The Ratings Act is in two parts. Part I establishes a ratings regime along 
the lines envisaged by the Brash Report except that more than one rating 
agency can be appointed and it seems that the price to be paid by the 
insurer for the rating is a matter for negotiation between an agency and an 
insurer. 27 The Act does not provide for the repeal of the Insurance 
Companies Deposits Act which instead is to be reviewed six months after 
the expiry of the period of two years following the first approval of an 
agency.28 
Part II of the Ratings Act provides for the inspection by the Registrar of 
Companies of insurance companies of doubtful solvency and powers are 
given to the Registrar similar to those given under s 365 of the Companies 
Act 1993. The purpose thus appears to be to bring non-corporate insurers 
19 Above, 12 & 22 &24. 
20 Above, 24. 
21 Above, 12 & 24. 
22 Above, 13. 
23 Above, 25. 
24 Above, 20 & 25. 
25Above, 14 & 24. 
26 Above, 15 & 24. 
27The Ratings Act, s 17. 
28The Ratings Act, s 24. 
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into an inspections regime.29 This paper is concerned only with the 
ratings regime created by the Ratings Act and the provisions relevant to 
that regime are discussed in more detail below. 
B Insurers Required to have a Current Rating 
Section 5 of the Act requires insurers to have a current rating from an 
"approved agency". A rating is an assessment (in letters, symbols, 
numbers or combinations of these) which indicates the insurer's ability to 
pay both existing and possible future claims.30 It must be registered with 
the Registrar of Companies within five working days of receipt31 and may 
be inspected by any person on payment of the prescribed fee.32 
Section 5 applies to all insurers carrying on insurance business in New 
Zealand with certain exceptions. The two principal exceptions are as 
follows. First, no rating is required in relation to the business of life 
insurance carried out by an insurer.33 Secondly, where an insurer is not a 
party to any policies of disaster or general insurance (as insurer not as 
insured) that insurer may elect not to have a current rating by lodging an 
election in the prescribed form with the Registrar.34 "Disaster insurance" 
is insurance against loss caused by earthquake, natural landslip, volcanic 
eruption, hydrothermal activity or tsunami and includes any fire damage 
which results.35 "General insurance" is other insurance against loss 
destruction or damage to tangible property including third party motor 
vehicle insurance.36 
C Approved Agencies 
Section 17 of the Act sets out the manner in which an agency becomes "an 
approved agency". 
17. Approval of Rating Agency - (1) Subject to this section, the Registrar shall, on the 
recommendation of the Insurance Council, approve a person or organisation as an 
approved agency ... and more than one person or organisation may be so recommended 
or approved. 
(2) An approval under this section shall be for a term not exceeding 3 years ... 
(4) Before approving a person or organisation ... the Registrar must be satisfied -
29The Ratings Act, s 2. An Insurance Company is defined to include both bodies corporate 
and associations of persons carrying any insurance business. 
30 Above, s 2. 
31The Ratings Act, ss 5 and 6. 
32The Ratings Act,s 7. 
33Toe Ratings Act, s4. S 4 also provides for another exception: an insurer that carries on 
insurance business "only with members of a group of companies of which the insurer is, or 
was, also a member". 
34The Ratings Act, s 9. 
35The Ratings Act, s 2. 
36Above. 
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(a) That the person or organisation has entered into a deed of agreement with the 
Insurance Council as to the method to be adopted and criteria to be used in 
determining ratings to be given to insurers ... ; and 
(b) That insurers that are required to have ratings under this Act but that are not 
members of the Council have been consulted about the terms of the agreement. 
(5) The registrar shall keep a copy of the agreement available for inspection, 
without fee, by any insurer that is required to have a rating .. . 
Thus the sequence of events appears to be as follows. First, the Insurance 
Council selects an agency or agencies; second, it consults with insurers 
who are not members, third, it enters into an agreement with that agency 
or those agencies (I will call an agreement of this sort a "council/ agency 
agreement") fourth, it recommends the agency or agencies to the Registrar 
and fifth, the Registrar approves an agency or agencies but not until it is 
satisfied that the agency/ council agreement has been entered into and the 
Council has consulted with insurers who are not members. 
The Registrar can revoke the approval of an agency if he or she is satisfied 
that the agency has, without sufficient cause, failed to provide a rating for 
an insurer. But before doing so, he or she must give the agency an 
opportunity to comment.37 
D The Agreements 
Section 19(1) of the Act requires that a council/agency agreement deal with 
certain matters: 
19. Agreement to govern ratings - (1) Every agreement ... -
(a) Must set out in a schedule to the agreement the method to be adopted and the 
criteria to be used by the approved agency in determining ratings ... ; and 
(b) May set out in that schedule terms applying to the provision of ratings by the 
approved agency. 
Section 19(2) of the Act envisages that an agreement will be entered into 
between the rating agency and the insurer (I will call this type of 
agreement an "agency /insurer agreement") and provides that the 
schedule to the agency/ council agreement is deemed to form part of an 
agency/ council agreement and overrides any provisions which are 
inconsistent with it. 
The rating criteria and method (and potentially other matters) are, 
therefore, determined by the Insurance Council and the agency and then 
imposed upon the insurer. However, the picture is more complex as the 
Council is a representative of its members and has a duty to consult with 
non-members as to the terms of the agency/ council agreement. The 
Council could, therefore, be described as the representative of all affected 
insurers when it agrees the terms of the agency/ council agreement. 
E Disclosure of Ratings and Credit Watch Warnings 
37The Ratings Act, s 18. 
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It has already been noted that an insurer's rating is registered and, 
therefore, available for public inspection. Where an insurer receives 
notice in writing of a "credit watch warning" given in relation to it, it 
must within five days register with the registrar a certificate from the 
agency containing the warning and stating the reasons for it.38 A "credit 
watch warning" is a word, expression or symbol used by an agency to 
indicate that the agency is considering downgrading the rating of the 
insurer.39 
An insurer is obliged to give public notice (in an issue of the New Zealand 
Gazette and in a newspaper) within ten days of the downgrading of any 
rating and is liable on summary conviction for a fine of up to $50,000 in 
the event it fails to do so.40 Disclosure to an insured is required before the 
contract of insurance is entered into and on renewal and if such disclosure 
does not occur, the insured has the right to cancel the policy.41 Insurers 
which are not required to be rated must, prior to entering into or renewing 
a contract of insurance (except life insurance), disclose their election not to 
be rated.42 
The Registrar is required to keep a copy of any agency/ council agreement 
or agreements available for inspection without fee by any insurer required 
to have a rating.43 The agreements are also available for inspection by the 
public on payment of a fee. 44 
F Appeal and Review 
The Act does not provide an insurer with any mechanism for appealing 
against or reviewing the decisions of the Registrar, Insurance Council or 
the rating agencies. 
IV THE DECISION-MAKERS 
A Introduction 
The scheme created by the Act identifies three decision-makers: the 
Registrar of Companies, the Insurance Council and the rating agency or 
agencies. The first is a statutory office-holder, the second is a private 
38The Ratings Act, s 6(2). 
39The Ratings Act, s 2. 
4D-fhe Ratings Act, ss3 and 8. 
41The Ratings Act ss 10 and 11. 
42The Ratings Act, s 12. 
43The Ratings Act, s 17(5). 
44The agreements are not "registered" with the Registrar and there is no specific 
requirment in the Act that they be made available for public inspection. However, the 
Registrar appears to have decided to keep a "register" of the agreements under s 21 of the 
Act. It would then follow that under s 363 of the Companies Act 1993 the agreements may 
be inspected by any person. 
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incorporated society and the third are international companies. Each of 
these decision-makers is discussed below in more detail. However, it 
must be borne in mind that the rationale for the regime is that the 
consumer ultimately decides and, therefore, regulates the insurance sector: 
this is the rationale expressed in the Brash report and is implicit in the 
disclosure-based regime implemented by the Act. The market's role as the 
fourth decision-maker will be discussed later in this paper. 
B The Registrar 
The Registrar means the Registrar of Companies "appointed under the 
Companies Act 1993" .45 The Companies Act provides for the 
appointment of Deputy Registrars, District Registrars and Assistant 
Registrars who may exercise the powers duties and functions of the 
Registrar subject to his or her control and of those higher in the 
hierarchy.46 Under the Companies Act the Registrar is required to keep 
registers of companies, accept documents for registration and make 
documents available for inspection by members of the public.47 Pursuant 
to s 21 of the Ratings Act it is obliged to keep "such registers as are 
necessary" for the purpose of Part I of the Act. 
C The Insurance Council 
The Insurance Council of New Zealand Incorporated48 traces it origins 
back to 189549 and is an association for the fire and general insurance 
industry. Until the Act, it was not recognised by statute and exercised no 
statutory powers or functions. Although membership of the Council is 
voluntary, it states that it: "represents over 90% of insurers and accounts 
for approximately 80% of business conducted in the New Zealand 
market" .50 
To become a member of the Council an insurer must be carrying on 
business in the insurance industry in New Zealand. "Insurance" is 
broadly defined but excludes life insurance.51 The insurer must comply 
with the Council's solvency requirements in order to become a member 
and is required to supply information to the Council at regular intervals 
so that the Council can monitor solvency.52 
45The Ratings Act, s 2. The Companies Act 1993 states that the actual appointments are 
made under the State Sector Act 1988 (see ss 357 and 358 of the Companies Act 1993). 
46The Companies Act 1993, ss 357 and 358. 
47The Companies Act 1993, ss360, 362 and 363. 
48It is incorporated under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. 
49Literature obtained from the Council in 1996: last year it celebrated its centenary. 
50Above. 
51See the Council's rules below n 59, paras 2 & 5. 
52By-laws and Solvency By-laws of The Insurance Council of New Zealand Inc. 
1 0 
Membership of the Council ceases in various circumstances including on 
ceasing to be a participant in the Ombudsman SchemeS3 and in the event 
that the member fails to remedy any solvency deficiency within a certain 
time.S4 In addition to participating in the Ombudsman Scheme, members 
are required to conduct themselves in accordance with the Council's Code 
of Ethics.SS 
The Council is managed by a board which is to consist of between five and 
nine persons who are members of the Council. The members of the board 
are elected annually by a meeting of the Council.56 The board appoints a 
chief executive officer who may have conferred upon him or her any of 
the powers exerciseable by the board.57 The Council is funded by levies on 
members.SB 
The objects of the Council include: advising, co-ordinating and promoting 
the insurance industry; undertaking and facilitating research; 
disseminating information; representing the industry; liaison with similar 
overseas organisations; promoting and enforcing as between members a 
code of ethics; and supporting and promoting the Insurance and Savings 
Ombudsman Scheme and doing any other thing or pursuing any other 
objective "which may seem to the Council to be in the interests of 
members and for the benefit of the industry"S9 
Its rules give the Council a broad range of powers to enable it to carry out 
its objects.60 Amongst these is the power to:61 
enter into any arrangement with any Government ... that may seem conducive to 
objects of the Council .. . and to obtain from any such Government .. . any ... charters 
Acts of Parliament monopolies rights powers privileges and concessions which the 
Council may think it desirable to obtain ... 
It can be assumed that it was pursuant to this power that the Council 
agreed to play its role under the Act. 
D The Rating Agencies 
1 Introduction 
53 Above, para 19. The current Obudsman Scheme is the Insurance and Savings Ombudsman 
Scheme. The first Ombudsman for this scheme took office in January 1995. The scheme has 
no statutory basis and provides a dispute resolution service for non-commercial insureds. 
54The Solvency By-laws above n 52 para l(g). 
55currently called the "Fair Insurance Code". 
56 Above, para 12. 
57 Above, para 14. 
58 Above, para 18. 
59Rules of the Insurance Council of New Zealand Incorporated (as at 2 August 1996), para 
3.1. 
60Above, para 4.1. 
61Above, para 4.l(n). 
1 1 
On 20 July 1995 the Registrar approved Standard & Poor's (Australia) Pty 
Ltd62 and AM Best Inc.63 under s 17 of the Act. Standard & Poor's and AM 
Best are amongst five international credit agencies with expertise in rating 
insurers.64 Set out below is general information on each of the rating 
agencies and their procedures. 
2 Standard & Poor's 
Standard & Poor's has since 1966 been part of McGraw-Hill, an 
international publishing, media, information and financial services 
firm. 65 Its origins date back to 1906 when Standard Statistics began an 
information service on US industrial companies.66 In addition to 
providing a financial rating service, Standard & Poor's provides a range of 
print publications including in New Zealand and Australia rating reports 
on all rated issuers/issues and a monthly bulletin.67 
The Standard & Poor's Ratings Group claims currently to monitor the 
credit quality of US$ 1.5 trillion worth of bonds and other financial 
instruments world-wide.68 It has offices in the United States, Europe and 
Asia and its analysts work in six departments: Corporate Finance, 
Financial Institutions, Insurance Rating Services and International 
Finance.69 
Its Insurance Rating Department rates the claims paying ability of insurers 
as well as bonds and commercial paper issued by them.70 Standard & 
Poor's started rating the claims paying ability of insurers in 1983 and is 
now the second leading insurer rating agency by number of United States 
insurers rated.71 
621ncorporated in Australia. 
631ncorporated in New Jersey U.S.A. 
64see "NAIC Report- Insurance Company Rating Agencies: A Description of Their Methods 
and Procedures Executive Summary" in Best's Insurance Management Reports "A special 
Report from the AM Best Company" February 19,1992. The other agencies are Moody's 
Investors Service, Duff & Phelps and Weiss Research. 
65current literature from Standard & Poor's Melbourne office. 
66Above. 
67 Above. 
68current literature.The group offices are in Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Mexico City, New 
York, Paris, San Francisco, Stockholm, Tokyo and Toronto. 
69current literature, above. 
70Above. 
7lsee the summary of a paper issued by the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners in Best's Insurance Management Reports, February 19, 1992: "A Special 
Report from the AM Best Company: Insurance Company Rating Agencies: A Description of 
their Methods and Procedures", 3. 
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Standard & Poor's rates the claims paying ability of more than 300 
insurance organisations world-wide.72 The claims ratings are performed 
at the request of the insurer and the insurer pays a rating fee in the range 
of US$ 15 ,OOO to US$ 32,000 depending on size and other factors. 73 Claims 
ratings are kept under "continuous surveillance" and reports are widely 
distributed in a range of publications.74 
Standard & Poor's also monitors about 2,000 US companies by way of 
"qualified solvency ratings". Its United Kingdom subsidiary, monitors a 
further 1,200 insurers outside the US.75 The qualified solvency ratings are 
not requested and are assigned to insurers on the basis of publicly available 
information.76 
The rating symbols used by Standard & Poor's range from AAA (superior 
financial security) through to CCC (extremely vulnerable financial 
security) with R connoting "regulatory action". Ratings AAA to BBB are 
the "secure range" and ratings BB to R the "vulnerable range".77 
3 AM Best 
AM Best was incorporated in 1899 and claims to be the first rating agency 
in the world to report on the financial condition of insurance 
companies.78 AM Best publishes a range of reports on the insurance sector 
both in the US and elsewhere. Its 1994 Property /Casualty and Life/Health 
editions of Best's Insurance Reports are said to contain more than 2,400 
and 1,575 companies respectively on insurers operating in the US market 
(virtually all significant and active companies); its International Edition 
began in 1995 and reports on more than 1,100 foreign property/ casualty 
and life/health companies in 65 countries.79 
Ratings of US companies are evaluated annually and quarterly and 
following any significant event. The annual review is performed 
following a "comprehensive collection of information requested" by AM 
Best.80 The fee for obtaining a rating from AM Best is, typically, US$ 500. 
Companies which do not meet AM Best's criteria for being rated are 
72Above n 65. 
73 Above n 64. 
74standard & Poors Guide to Claims-Paying Ability Ratings, 2. A copy is appendix 2 to the 
S & P Deed, below n x. The publications include: S & P's Insurance Book, S & P's Insurer 
Solvency Review, S & P's Insurance Digest, S & P's FOCUS Magazine and S & P's Insurer 
Ratings List. 
75 Above n x (the lit). 
76 Above n 64, 4. 
77 Above n 74, appendix. Ratings from AA to B may be modified with the addition of a"+" 
or a "-". 
78The Preface to the 1995 Edition of Best's Insurance Reports-International, vii. A copy 
forms appendix 2 to the AM Best Deed. 
79Above. 
80Above. 
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assigned a "not assigned" rating classification or a Financial Performance 
Index (FPI) assignment.81 AM Best provides a host of other information 
services.82 
AM Best uses a variety of different rating classification systems.83 The 
scale adopted for the rating of New Zealand insurers ranges from A++ 
(superior) to D (very vulnerable) with E signifying "under supervision" 
and F "in liquidation". The range A++ to B+ is categorised as "secure" and 
B and below as "insecure".84 
V THE AGENCY/COUNCIL AND THE AGENCY/INSURER 
AGREEMENTS 
A Introduction 
On 13 and 19 July 1995 respectively Standard & Poor's and AM Best had 
entered into agreements with the Insurance Council as required bys 19 of 
the Act. The agreements are in the form of deeds. They are registered 
with the Registrar of Companies and may be obtained on payment of a fee. 
Both Deeds contain schedules setting out the rating method and criteria 
and other terms which, under s 19(2) of the Ratings Act, are deemed to 
form part of each agency /insurer agreement. The schedules require that 
the insurer provide certain information to the agency and that the agency 
prepare a rating in accordance with the methodology set out. The insurer 
must also pay the fees set out in the agency /insurer agreement.85 
B The Standard & Poors Deed 
The Standard & Poors Deed ("the S & P Deed") provides that Standard & 
Poors will ensure that it has the ability to carry out ratings on any entity 
which wishes to carry on insurance business in New Zealand.86 It agrees 
that its ratings will be in accordance with the Act and the S & P Deed.87 
Ratings of insurers are to be determined in accordance with the method 
and criteria set out in the schedule and the schedule is deemed to be 
incorporated into every agreement between the agency and the insurer.88 
The Deed takes effect from the date of approval of Standard & Poors by the 
81 Above n 64, 3. 
82Above n 78, viii. 
83 Above n 64 , 3. 
84see AM Best Deed below, 15. 
851 understand that the rating fees charged by AM Best to New Zealand Insurers are in the 
order of US$ 12,000 per annum. I am unaware of the fees charged by Standard & Poors. 
86The S & P Deed, cl 2.2. 
87The S & P Deed, cl 2.1. 
88The S & P Deed, cl 4.1 and 5. 
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Registrar (20 July 1995) and terminates on expiry or earlier termination of 
the approval.89 
The Deed and the schedule may be amended but the amendment will not 
be effective unless approved by the Registrar.90 Standard & Poors cannot 
assign or sub-contract its obligations under the Deed unless it has the prior 
approval of both the Council and the Registrar.91 It is provided that the 
Deed shall be governed by the law of New Zealand.92 
The schedule to the S & P Deed (which forms part of any agreements 
between the insurer and Standard & Poors) requires the insurer to provide 
to Standard & Poors "such information as is deemed necessary" and sets 
out a non-exclusive list of the type of information required.93 The insurer 
is obliged to make senior executives available for interview as required by 
Standard & Poors .94 During the currency of the rating the insurer is 
required to provide material financial and other information, and any 
information requested by Standard & Poors.95 
Standard & Poors agrees to prepare the rating in accordance with the 
methodology and criteria set out in Part B of the Schedule and to prepare a 
draft rating report based on information obtained.96 The draft rating 
report is to be provided to the insurer within a reasonable time (usually 
not exceeding 60 days) and : '[t]he Insurer will have the opportunity to 
discuss and comment upon the draft report".97 If the insurer wants the 
draft rating re-examined, it has two working days to notify S&P and 
provide grounds of appeal and it is then in S&P's "sole discretion" 
whether it then amends the draft rating.98 If the insurer does not object to 
the rating, Standard & Poors must assign the rating within 15 days of 
delivery of the draft report.99 
The insurer agrees to register the rating within 5 working days and to 
make disclosure as required by the Act100 and Standard & Poors will, in 
any event, advise the Registrar within that period that a rating has been 
89The S & P Deed, cl 6.1. 
90The S & P Deed, cl 7.1. 
91 The S & P Deed, cl 8.1. 
92The S & P Deed, cl 9.1. 
93The Schedule to the S & P Deed, Part A, cl, 1. 
94Above, cl 1.2. 
95 Above, cl 1.3. 
96Above, cl 2.1. 
97 Above, cl 2.2. 
98 Above, cl 2.4. 
99 Above, cl 2.3. 
100 Above, cl 3.1. 
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delivered.1°1 Standard & Poors and the insurer are able to publish the 
rating and associated information.102 
It is agreed that Standard & Poors will monitor the affairs of the insurer 
throughout the term of the rating and "if circumstances occur which the 
Agency believes justify review of the rating, the Agency will notify the 
Insurer and may place the Insurer on any credit review, credit watch or 
credit warning list published by the agency". A certificate of the credit 
watch warning is to be provided to the insurer within five working days 
and this is to be registered with the Registrar.103 Standard & Poors notifies 
the Registrar that such a warning has been issued.104 
The agreement can be terminated on 90 working days notice and 
automatically upon expiry or earlier termination of Standard & Poors 
approved agency status.105 New Zealand law is to govern the 
agreemen t. 106 
C The AM Best Deed 
The AM Best Deed (but not the schedule to it) is in the same form as the S 
& P Deed discussed above. 
The Schedule to the AM Best Deed, however, is different in the following 
respects. First, the information and access to personnel to be provided by 
the insured is expressed in a different way107 as are the methodology and 
criteria set out in part B of the Schedule.108 Except in relation to the 
criteria to be applied, the AM Best Deed is more specific than the S & P 
Deed regarding the information required and the steps to be taken. 
Second, the provisions relating to "credit watch warning" are similar109 
but those concerning the procedure for finalising the rating are quite 
distinct. Under the AM Best Deed a draft report is to be provided to the 
insurer within 45 days of receipt by AM Best of necessary information. It is 
stated that the insurer "will have an opportunity to discuss and comment 
upon the report"110 but, unlike the S & P Deed, there is no provision for 
an appeal. 
D Comments 
101 Above, cl 3.3. 
102 Above, cls 3.2 and 3.4. 
103Above, cl 5.1. 
104Above, cl 5.2. 
105 Above, cl 8.1. 
106Above, cl 10.1. 
107 Compare part A, cl 1 of the Schedules to each of the Deeds. 
108compare part B of each of the Schedules. 
109Part A of the Schedule to the AM Best Deed, cl 5. 
llOschedule to the AM Best Deed ,Part A, cl 2.2. 
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The notable features of the agency/ council agreements are as follows. 
First, they require the agencies to take particular matters into account in 
relation to the rating but not in relation to a credit watch warning (where 
they have an unfettered discretion). Secondly, they provide minimal 
opportunity for an insurer to challenge either the rating or the decision to 
issue a credit watch warning. Thirdly, the fact that the methodology and 
criteria are differently expressed in the two deeds suggests that the agencies 
are imposing their terms on the Insurance Council rather than the other 
way round. 
VI THE NON-UNITARY STATE 
A Introduction 
A traditional form of government regulation of insurers may have 
involved subjecting them to regulation by an agency created by an Act of 
Parliament and empowered by that Act. Instead, the state has enacted 
legislation which employs the expertise and interest representation of a 
self-regulatory organisation (the Council) and the expertise, reputation 
and power of one international organisation (Standard & Poors) and a 
large US organisation (AM Best). Furthermore, the overall objective of 
the Act appears to be expose insurers to the market. It will be seen later in 
this paper that the Courts struggle to fit such types of regulation into the 
rubric of judicial review. This part of the paper examines why such 
difficulties arise and suggests that to resolve them the Courts need to 
acknowledge that the state is not unitary and to develop a rationale for 
judicial review which recognises this. 
B Judicial Review and the Unitary State 
The traditional basis for judicial review derives from the theories of the 
Victorian jurist, Dicey111 and, in particular his assertion that in a 
representative democracy of the United Kingdom model112 parliament 
(the legislature) is sovereign.113 One aspect of parliamentary sovereignty 
is that parliament is omnicompetent: it can make laws and then unmake 
them and there is no other body which has the power to override or set 
aside legislation passed by parliament.11 4 Another aspect is that 
lllcraig (Public Law below n 114, 22) explains that the basis for judicial review was not 
initially conceived in these terms but that during the 19th Century it came to be so 
conceived. 
112New Zealand's transition to Mixed Member Proportional representation does not affect 
the normative basis for Dicey's theory. 
113Sir William Wade & C Forsyth Administrative Law (7 ed,Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1994) 24; PP Craig Administrative Law (3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1994) 4. AW 
Bradley "The Sovereignty of Parliament" in J Jowell and D Oliver eds The Changing 
Constitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1985) 23, 24. 
114Above Wade, 29; Craig, 4. PP Craig Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom 
and the United States of America (1 ed, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1990) 13. 
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parliament exercises a monopoly of power: that is all governmental power 
should be subject to parliamentary oversight and legitimation.115 That is: 
"The state [is] unitary, with all real public power being concentrated in the 
duly elected Parliament".116 
The traditional rationale for judicial review can be seen to follow quite 
simply from these propositions. First, if parliament is omnicompetent a 
body given power to act by parliament must not exceed the terms of its 
remit. If it were allowed to do so it would usurp the power of 
parliament.117 Hence judicial review is available if such a body acts ultra 
vires (outside its powers).1 18 Secondly, as parliament exercises a 
monopoly of governmental power, the Courts in their judicial review 
function need only concern themselves with exercises of this type of 
power: power exercised by bodies not empowered by parliament, even if 
regulatory in nature, is not the concern of judicial review.119 
C The State is Non-Unitary 
The theory of parliamentary sovereignty was at the time of its conception 
by Dicey,120 and continues to be, flawed. First, it is clear that Parliament is 
not truly sovereign as it is dominated by the executive which has the 
power and the resources to initiate and develop legislation leaving the 
legislature with little real control over the legislative programme.121 
Even the power of parliament to criticise and to veto legislation is limited 
due to systems of party control designed to ensure that members comply 
with party dictates.122 
Second, political theorists have long challenged Dicey's unitary conception 
of democracy and pointed to other powerful groups within society which 
shape and constrain state action.123 Theories which espouse this view are 
broadly described as "pluralist". The pluralist thesis is that political (and 
other) decisions result from the interaction of powerful groups (which 
may include the executive and legislature) rather than solely from 
parliamentary or government initiatives.1 24 However, how groups 
actually do interact and how they should interact is a matter for debate. 
l15craig Administrative Law above n 113, 4; Craig Public Law above nl14, 20. 
116craig Public Law above n 114, 21. 
117craig Public Law above n 114, 21. Bradley above n 113, 27. 
118craig Administrative Law above n 113, 7. 
119This is apparent from the cases discussed in the next part of this paper. See also Julia 
Black "Constitutionalising Self-Regulation" [1996] MLR 24, 43. 
120craig Public Law above n x, 30-47. 
121see Craig Public Law above n 114, 39-47 See. R Mulgan Politics in New Zealand 
(Auckland University Press, Auckland, 1994) 69, 90-92, 109-111. 
122craig Public Law above n 114, 45. Mulgan above n 121, 81. 
123craig Administrative Law above n 113, 25-32; Craig Public Law aboven114, 137-158. For 
a New Zealand perspective see Mulgan above n 121 chs 1, 2, 9 & 13. 
124Mulgan above n 121, 9. 
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Public choice theory is an aspect of the free-market policies current in New 
Zealand and elsewhere.125 It prescribes a limited role for the state and 
eschews the legitimacy of group influence. This is because it sees 
individuals as the ultimate decision-makers.126 However, devolution to 
the market can itself be seen as the "ultimate in pluralistic 
decentralisation"127 and consumers may themselves form groups in order 
to promote their self-interest.128 A distinctive model of pluralism can be 
discerned in the free-market policies pursued by recent English, New 
Zealand and other governments. It is described by Craig as "market-
oriented pluralism".129 It will be argued that policies pursued in New 
Zealand since 1984 are also manifestations of market-oriented pluralism as 
is the ratings regime itself. 
D Market-oriented Pluralism 
Paradoxically the introduction of free market reforms appears to require a 
strong state. This is so that the new policies can be implemented, their 
opponents defeated and to police the market to ensure equality of 
bargaining agents.BO The remarkable changes which have taken place in 
New Zealand since 1984 could not have been effected otherwise.131 
Society can still, however, be characterised as pluralistic. There is a 
preference for market-based solutions to economic problems, and an 
implicit assumption that the market is a better regulator than 
government. However, this means that decision-making by the market 
becomes a dominant and preferred form of decision-making in many 
areas.132 A belief that the market is a better regulator than government 
dominant in the New Zealand reforms.133 It is evident in both Treasury 
papers backgrounding the reforms134 and in the policies pursued which 
have introduced or reinforced "market regulation" or "decision making by 
the market" in many areas.135 
12Ssee J Boston "The Theoretical Underpinnings of Public Sector Restructuring in New 
Zealand" 1, 2 in Boston, Martin, Pallot and Walsh eds Reshaping the State: New 
Zealand's Bureaucratic Revolution (Oxford University Press, Auckland). 
126Mulgan above n 121, 197. Above Craig Public Law 63. 
127craig, Public Law above n 114, 156. 
12Bcraig Public Law above n 114, 63. 
l29craigAdministrative Law above n 113, 34; CraigPublic Law above n 114, 153. 
130craig Public Law, above n 114, 155. 
131see Mulgan above n 121, 110. Examples are the reform of industrial relations and the 
health sector. 
132craig Public Law above n 114, 156 
133see above n 125. 
1345ee J Kelsey The New Zealand Experiment (Auckland University Press, Bridget 
Williams Books, Wellington, 1995) 58. 
135For example, employment, the financial markets trade and industry, foreign investment, 
resource management, and the media. This approach is also implicit in the corporatisation 
of state activities including land ownership, forestry, electricity, telecommunications, coal, 
airways, New Zealand Post, Government Property Services and the hospitals (See Kelsey 
above part 2). 
1 9 
Society also remains pluralistic because the initiating and shaping of policy 
is still the outcome of interaction between interest groups including 
government departments, external pressure groups, parliament and 
cabinet.136 This is manifest in the development and implementation of 
the New Zealand reforms. The interaction of Cabinet, Treasury the State-
Services Commission and the reserve Bank has been described.137 Key 
lobby-groups which have infhienced this process include the Business 
Roundtable, the Chamber of Commerce the Employers' Federation, 
Federated Farmers the Retailers' Federation and the Manufacturers' 
Feder a tion.138 
An aspect of market-oriented pluralism is the tendency of the executive 
and groups to make policy which by-passes parliament.139 For example, 
government may decide to attain its goals through the use of its wealth 
rather than by enacting laws.140 It may do this simply by entering into a 
contract with a party in which case the contract will provide the terms on 
which payment is to be made. Alternatively, it may enact legislation 
which provides for funding of certain activities subject to funding 
agreements to be entered into between the Crown and the party.141 
Enacting legislation has its disadvantages: legislation has to be developed 
and approved by parliament and there are delays (and associated expense) 
as well as political costs associated with the legislative process.142 The use 
of government wealth and contracts, on the other hand, allows informal 
arrangements and experiments with policy choices.143 In New Zealand 
"government by contract" is a notable feature of the free-market 
reforms.144 The Health and Disability Services Act, for example, provides 
for "funding agreements" under which the Crown agrees to provide 
money to the four RHAs and other purchasers of health and disability 
services.145 In return the RHAs agree to comply with the terms of the 
funding agreement which is an extensive document setting out detailed 
requirements for the services to be purchased.146 In this type of situation, 
the contract is being used not as an instrument of exchange between the 
136craig Public Law above n 114, 64. 
137Kelsey above n 134, 49. 
138Kelsey above , 73-81. Mulgan above n 121, 200. 
139craig Public Law above n 114, 187. 
140see T Daintith "The Executive Power Today" in The Changing Constitution above n 113, 
174. 
141Daintith above n 140, 183. 
142Daintith above n 140, 181 and see Craig Public Law above n 114, 187. 
143Above. 
144See J Boston in the preface to J Boston (ed)The State Under Contract (Bridget William 
Books, Wellington, 1995). 
145The Health and Disability Services Act 1993. 
146Ministry of Health 1996/97 Funding Agreement Between the Crown and the RHAs. The 
Ministry allows inspection of a version of the Agreement which has deleted from it 
financially sensitive information. 
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parties but rather as a tool to regulate their conduct.147 The state may also 
use contract as a regulatory tool where it is not providing funding. This 
will be discussed below in relation to the Ratings Regime.148 
Parliamentary and, therefore, electoral control over government is 
restricted: it is further restricted when policy is implemented by 
government under regulatory contracts which receive no parliamentary 
scrutiny at all. Society is, furthermore, pluralist so that other bodies in 
society exercise power and perform regulatory functions similar to those 
performed by government and use contract as a regulatory tool. They are 
subject to no scrutiny at all. 
E Market-Oriented Pluralism and the Rating of Insurance Companies 
Although the ratings regime is premised on free-market ideas it manifests 
a strong state because it imposes market-based regulation on the insurance 
sector. The Brash Report also proceeds on the assumption that a 
mechanism which subjects insurers to the market will be more efficient. 
Hence little consideration is given to governmental regulatory control 
notwithstanding that it is the preferred form of regulation in other 
countries. 
The ratings regime is pluralist. The regulation of insurers under the Act 
results not from licensing system imposed on insurers by the state but 
from the interaction of powerful groups within society: the market, a 
private regulatory organisation, specialist corporations and the state. Its 
thrust is that decisions about which insurers should thrive and which 
should fail is to be made by consumers, that is, the market. However, 
because insurance accounting is obscure, other powerful bodies are 
involved and are instrumental to the decision-making process: the 
Insurance Council, a private insurance sector regulatory organisation 
selects and negotiates terms with the rating agents. The rating agencies, 
private corporations, prepare the ratings for their insurer clients but are 
obliged to apply methodology and criteria agreed with the Council. The 
Registrar of Companies, a statutory office holder, approves the rating 
agents selected by the Council. 
The initiation and shaping of the policy behind the Act can also be 
characterised as pluralist: it appear to have evolved through the 
interactions of the Governor of the Reserve Bank, the Earthquake and 
War Damage Commissioner, the Justice Department and the Insurance 
Council. 
147see J Martin "Contracting and Accountability" in The State Under Contract above n 144, 
36, 39. 
148See also, for example, the Civil Aviation Authority provided for under the Civil 
Aviation Act 1990. The body is funded partly by government and partly by user-pays. The 
regulatory mechanism is a "performance agreement" with the Minister of Transport. 
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A feature of the regime is the use of contracts as a form of regulation. In 
neither case is the contract used in the traditional way, as an instrument of 
exchange. The agreement between the Council and the agencies is not a 
bargain: its sole purpose is to determine how insurers will be rated. Nor is 
the agreement between the rating agencies and the insurers: it is simply a 
means by which insurers are required to be subjected to the ratings criteria 
and methodology. 
VII THE COURTS AND THE PLURALIST STATE: REVIEW OF 
PRIVATE BODIES 
A Introduction 
The rationale for judicial review flowed from a conception of the unitary 
state. This conception is flawed. The state in both England and New 
Zealand can be categorised as species of market-oriented pluralism. The 
current case law contains little acknowledgement that groups in society 
other than government exercise powers which it may be appropriate to 
subject to judicial review. The ratings regime involves private bodies 
which combine to regulate insurers. Below I discuss in broad terms how 
key English and New Zealand cases have dealt with proceedings for 
judicial review of bodies not created by statute. 
B Non-Statutory "Governmental" Bodies 
The development of judicial review in New Zealand in relation to non-
statutory bodies has been inhibited by the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 
("the JAA") which requires the exercise refusal to exercise, or proposed or 
purported exercise of a statutory power (as defined)149 before the 
simplified procedure (an Application for Review) is available.ISO 
Although proceedings under the prerogative writs can still be brought,151 
they have been little used in the years since the passing of the JAA 
although their substantive availability remains the basis for an 
Application for Review.152 In England, however, the procedural reforms 
do not require the exercise of statutory powers and are tied to the 
circumstances where the prerogative writs would be available.153 This has 
allowed judicial review to develop outside the scope of the exercise of 
statutory powers. 
149Note, however, the extended definition ins 3 extends beyond powers or rights conferred 
by Acts to those conferred by or under the constition or other instrument of incorporation, 
rules or by laws of any body corporate. The definition of "statutory power of decision" 
(included in the definition of statutory power) is extended accordingly. 
lSOThe JAA, s 4(1). 
lSlsee part VII of the High Court Rules. 
1525 4(1) is to the effect that where a statutory power etc has been exercised etc the 
applicant is entitled to the relief he or she would have been entitled under the prerogative 
writs or in proceedings for a declaration or injunction. See Re Royal Commission on the 
Thomas Case [1980] 1 NZLR 602, 615 where the Full Court of the High Court indicated that 
the availability of such relief was a prerequisite. 
153See Order 53 of the Supreme court rules (UK) and s 31 of the Supreme Court Act (UK). 
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A high point of review of private bodies was the decision of the English 
Court of Appeal in Data/in 154 where it was held that the Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers, a self-regulating unincorporated body with no 
statutory, prerogative or common law powers, was a sufficiently public 
body to be subjected to judicial review. The Court found that both the 
origins and function of a body could be taken into account. The Panel 
operated in the public interest but was also part of a regulatory system 
underpinned by the state. 
The Court relied on general statements made in an earlier High Court 
decision l55 to the effect that the only constant limits to the remedy of 
certiorari are that the tribunal is performing a public duty; and that its 
authority is not solely derived from an agreement. However, each of the 
judges ties the Panel's powers to government in some way. Thus Lord 
Donaldson refers to the need to recognise the "realities of executive 
power" and the enhancement of the Panel's powers by statutory powers 
wielded by the Department of Trade and Industry and the Bank of 
England .15 6 Nicholls LJ reasons that there has been an implied 
devolution of powers by the Council of the Stock Exchange (a body with 
powers from a statutory source) to the Panel;157 and Lloyd LJ says that 
there has been "an implied devolution of power" from the government to 
the panel so that the source of the power is at least in part 
governmental.158 
In New Zealand, the Privy Council in Mercury l59 held that State Owned 
Enterprises ("SOEs"), which are notionally private companies formed 
under the Companies Act, are public bodies which may be subject to 
judicial review. The Privy Council referred to their public origins (their 
shares are held by ministers and they are established by the State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986) and their public functions. 
In England a series of cases followed Data/in where it was unsuccessfully 
argued that the decisions of powerful private regulatory bodies should be 
reviewable. In each case the court found that review was unavailable. 
Thus a decision of the Chief Rabbi of Great Britain declaring a Rabbi unfit 
to hold office following an enquiry was found to be one which could not 
be reviewed.160 The court said that in order for judicial review to be 
154R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, ex parte Datafin & anor [1987) 1 All ER 564. 
155R v Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex parte Lain [1967] 2 All ER 770. 
156oatafin above n 154, 567. 
157Datafin above n 154, 587. 
158Datafin above n 154, 585. 
159Mercury Energy Ltd v Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd [1994) 2 NZLR 385. 
160 R v Chief Rabbi, ex parte Wachman [1993) 2 All ER 249; R v Football Association Ltd, 
ex parte Football League Ltd [1993) 2 All ER 833; R v Jockey Club ex parte Aga Khan [1993) 2 
All ER 853. None of these bodies was empowered by statute or supported or sustained by 
statute or regulation. 
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available: "there must be not merely a public but a potentially a 
governmental interest in the decision-making power in question".161 
Applications for review of powerful private bodies regulating sport and 
exercising de facto monopoly control over the sport in question, were held 
not to be capable of judicial review. In two High Court cases it was held 
that decisions of the English Jockey Club could not be reviewed even 
although the applicants had no contract with the club and therefore no 
contractual remedies.162 Review was declined for similar reasons in a case 
involving the decision of the English Football Association to set up the 
Premier League although in that case the Court found a contract between 
the applicant (the Football League) and the Association.163 In the Aga 
Khan case164 the Court of Appeal denied review of a disciplinary decision 
of the Jockey Club referring to the entirely private origins of the Club and 
the existence of a contract between the Club and the applicant. Two of the 
three judges (Bingham MR and Farquharson J) suggested, however, that 
in the absence of a contract review might be available in some 
circumstances.165 
C Non-Statutory "Domestic" Bodies 
The cases discussed above do not explain another line of cases where the 
courts have been prepared to allow what is effectively judicial review of 
the rules and decisions of domestic bodies. These cases do not rely on a 
finding that the power exercised is derived from government. Relief is 
granted, in part, on the basis that the body operates as a system of "mini-
government" in much the same way and with much the same public 
effects as a statutory body. 
Thus in England rules of the Football Association166 and the 
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain167 could be declared invalid 
because they amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade as could a 
decision by the Jockey Club not to award a training licence to a woman.168 
A rule of the Football Association which denied legal representation to a 
club appealing against disciplinary sanctions169 and a decision of a union 
not to approve the election of a shop steward and made in breach of the 
principles of natural justice170 could be declared invalid. In Stiniato v 
Auckland Boxing Association (Inc) and Others171 the New Zealand Court 
161 Above, 254. 
162R v Disciplinary Committee of the Jockey Club, exp Massingberd-Mundy [1993] 2 All ER 
207; R v Jockey Club, exp RAM Racecourses Ltd [1993] 2 All ER 225. 
163R v Football Association ex p Football League [1993] 2 All ER 833. 
164R v Committee of the Jockey Club, ex parte Aga Khan [1993] 2 All ER 853. 
165 Above, 865 & 867 (per Bingham MR); 873 (per Farquharson LJ). 
166Eastham v Newcastle United Football Club [1963]3 All ER 139; 
167Dickson v Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain [1970] AC 403(HOL). 
168 Nagle v Fielden [1966] 1 All ER 689 (CA). 
169Enderby Town Football Club v Football Association Ltd [1971] 1 All ER 215 (CA); 
170Breen v Amalgamated Engineering Union [1971] 1 All ER 1148 (CA). 
171[1978] 1 NZLR l(CA). 
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of Appeal found that the Boxing Association's decision to refuse a license 
could be declared invalid in the event it had denied Mr Stiniato a right to 
be heard and, therefore, made a decision which operated as an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. 
In all but one of these cases there was no contract between the decision-
maker and the party affected and in the other the court stated that the 
absence of a contract was not a bar to relief.172 In some of these cases 
(including Stiniato) the Court derided the invention of fictitious contracts 
to allow relief and stated that the rules of these bodies amounted to a code 
which should be subject to the control of the courts in the same way as a 
legislative code and applying the principles which apply to statutory 
bodies.173 In each case the bodies exercised considerable or monopoly 
power. 174 and this is stated in several cases to be the basis for 
intervention.175 
The high point of review of decisions of domestic bodies in New Zealand 
is Finnigan v New Zealand Football Union Inc (No 2)176 where the High 
Court (following strong hints made in the Court of Appeal in its decision 
on standing)177 found that, in relation to the decision to tour South Africa, 
the NZRFU was obliged to exercise the degree of care normally imposed 
on statutory bodies in the exercise of their powers. 
The New Zealand and English Court of Appeal decisions concerning 
domestic bodies and discussed above were all decided prior to Aga Khan 
178 where the English Court of Appeal clearly indicated that it did not 
support the general implication of public law duties in relation to 
decisions made by powerful private associations . Bingham MR and 
Farquharson J do not discuss the domestic body cases.179 The third judge, 
Hoffman LJ, clearly disagrees with the proposition that these cases would 
now find their home in public law.180 Aga Khan was decided on an 
Application for Judicial Review and not in ordinary proceedings for a 
declaration. However, it would seem unlikely that an English Appeal 
Court would circumvent this decision by allowing effective judicial 
review on all public law grounds of such bodies. The English Court of 
Appeal has, however, recently confirmed that a person affected by rules of 
172See Dickson above n 167, 440. 
173see above eg Enderby 219; Breen 1154. Stiniato, 5 (per Richmond P) 26 (per Cooke J) . 
174Toe Football Association Ltd and The Football League Ltd (Eastham); The Football 
Association Ltd (Enderby); The Jockey Club (Nagle); A union (Breen). 
17Ssee in particular Nagle (above n 168, 693) where Lord Denning states: "If a man applies 
to join a social club and is blackballed, he has no cause of action ... but we are not considering 
a social club. We are considering an association which exercises a virtual monopoly in a 
field of human activity. By refusing or withdrawing a licence, the stewards can put a man 
out of business. This is a great power." 
176(1985] 2 NZLR 181 
177[1985]2 NZLR 159, 179. 
178See above n 164. 
179Except to record the arguments made by counsel. 
180see Aga Khan above n 164, 875. 
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a private regulatory body operating as a restraint of trade but who has no 
contract with the body may obtain relief in ordinary proceedings.181 
A result of an amendment in 1977 to the JAA182 is that an Application for 
Review may be made in relation to powers or rights conferred by or under 
the constitution or other instrument of incorporation, rules or bylaws of 
any body corporate. The definition of "statutory power of decision" 
(included in the definition of statutory power) is extended accordingly. 
The amendment appears to have been in response to cases of the sort 
discussed earlier which suggest that non-statutory regulatory bodies may 
be analogous to statutory bodies and that, therefore, similar relief should 
be granted on similar grounds.183 The JAA is a procedural reform and 
does not operate to extend the substantive grounds for relief.184 In practice 
it may result in a greater preparedness to review private bodies.185 It 
should be noted, however, that neither Stiniato nor Finnigan were 
Applications for Review under the JAA. 
Recent decisions of the New Zealand High Court which endeavour to 
canvas the scope of judicial review of private bodies in New Zealand do 
not articulate any clear principles. The approach is conservative and 
incremental. It seeks to restrict review of private bodies to particular 
situations in the decided cases and to read down cases of the Stiniato type. 
Thus in Peters v Collinge186 Fisher J said that "non-contractual" review of 
private bodies was restricted to "some special situations" and referred to 
bodies exercising quasi-public functions,187 perhaps where the body 
contemplated an action of significant direct impact upon the public188 and 
where exclusion powers or their exercise can be struck down as 
unreasonable restraints of trade. In Waitakere City v Waitemata 
Electricity Shareholders189 Fisher J added to this list by referring to a 
voluntary or commercial organisation which is publicly owned and makes 
decisions in the public interest which could adversely affect the rights and 
liabilites of private individuals without other form of redress.19° Cases 
such as Breen 191and Enderby,192 he says, can be explained on the basis that 
181stevenage Borough Football Club Ltd v The Football League Ltd The Times Law Reports 
9 August 1996 (on appeal from a decision reported in The Times Law Reports 1 August 1996). 
1825 10 of the Judicature Amendment Act 1977. 
183see the Eighth Report of the Public and Administrative Law Reform Committee, 20 and 
the Explanatory Note to the Judicature Amendment Bill in the Appendices. 
184see above n 152 
185for example the New Zealand Court of Appeal has emphasised that New Zealand 
adminstrative law is "significantly indigenous" and in this respect pointed to the "wider 
scope for judicial review" under the JAA than under the reformed English procedure. See 
Budget Rent A Car v ARA [1985] 2 NZLR 414, 418 (per Cooke J). 
186[1993] 2 NZLR 554. 
187Citing Datafin above n 154. 
188Citing Finnigan above n 176. 
189[1996] 2 NZLR 735, 747. 
190citing Mercury above n 159. 
191Above n 170. 
192Above n 169. 
26 
the courts are prepared to declare illegal and void certain contractual terms 
if they are contrary to public policy.193 
D Conclusions 
The approach to judicial review of private bodies in England and New 
Zealand is confused and lacks a clear conceptual base. The English 
approach is traditional and ties review to the exercise of powers which can 
be described as governmental. The result thus depends not on any clear 
principles but rather on whether there can be said to be some statutory 
underpinning. Thus if a body is so powerful that its powers need not be 
enhanced by statutory sanction, it will not be subject to review; whereas if 
its powers have to be shored up by government in some way it will. This 
is illogical and results from a failure by the courts to acknowledge that 
society is pluralist. It is also inconsistent with the approach of the courts 
in the domestic body cases. 
Recent New Zealand cases suggest a desire not to extend the availability of 
review of domestic non-governmental bodies and do not assist either in 
clarifying the scope of review or settling any principles. The New Zealand 
procedural reforms add to the confusion: review is available under the 
JAA in relation to the exercise of statutory powers conferred under Acts 
yet the category of "governmental" bodies now extends beyond this. 
Review is also available in relation to the constitutions etc of incorporated 
bodies. Yet the substantive basis for reviewing such bodies is quite 
restricted and there is no logical reason why the procedure should not also 
be available in relation to unincorporated bodies. 
VIII THE COURTS AND THE PLURALIST ST ATE: JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND CONTRACT 
The English Courts have excluded from the realm of judicial review 
bodies whose power is solely conferred by contract.194 Furthermore the 
English Court of Appeal in the AgaKhan case found against the applicant, 
in part, because he had a private law remedy in contract although that case 
also involved a wholly private body.195 In some cases, furthermore, the 
English courts have eschewed the availability of all relief simply because 
there is a contract between the parties even where the body itself is subject 
to a degree of statutory underpinning196 or, in the realm of employment, 
a statutory body.197 
193Above n 189,747; referring to Enderby. 
194See text above n 155. 
195 Above n 164. 
196R v Lloyd's, exp Briggs [1993] Lloyd's LR 176; R v Insurance Ombudsman, exp Aegon Life 
Assurance Ltd [1995] LRLR 101. 
197R v East Berkshire Health Authority, ex p Walsh [1985] 1 QB 152 (CA); R v Derbyshire 
Council, Exp Noble [1990] ICR 808; McLaren v Home Office [1990] ICR 824. 
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Contradicting this approach, however, are suggestions made that the 
decisions of Self-Regulating Organisations, made under their rules and 
affecting members who have contracts, may be subject to judicial 
review.198 These bodies are underpinned by the Financial Services Act 
1986 (UK). These cases appear to be the only United Kingdom authorities 
where a contract is treated as if it were a statutory code. In New Zealand 
some decisions of the Industrial Courts suggest that a registered 
agreement199 or a collective employment contract200 may be reviewable in 
the same way as a statutory code. However, none of these cases contain 
any careful analysis of the law. 
The position of contractual powers exercised by statutory bodies has, on 
the other hand, been considered in some depth in New Zealand and 
England.201 The New Zealand Court of Appeal discussed the position in 
the two Webster v Auckland Harbour Board cases.202 There it was held 
that the Harbour Board, a body with statutory powers to license the 
foreshore, could be subject to judicial review on public law grounds. It 
was noted that a statute may expressly or impliedly require that certain 
matters be taken into account and that all such bodies must act in good 
faith.203 The Court followed the approach of the English Court of Appeal 
in Cannock 204 where a local authority was found to owe public law duties 
in relation to its decision to issue a notice to quit made under statutory 
powers to manage property. 
In Budget Rent A Car Ltd v ARA the Court of Appeal indicated that 
decisions to grant or refuse a license made under broad managerial powers 
conferred by an Act may be reviewed.205 Marlborough Harbour Board v 
Goulden206 on the other hand allowed judicial review of a decision to 
terminate employment made under specific statutory powers to appoint 
and employ personnel and remove or discontinue their offices. The Court 
198Bank of Scotland v Investment Management Regulatory Organisation Ltd The Scots Law 
Times, 16 June 1989, 432. 
R v Lautro, exp Ross [1993] 1 All ER 545, 554 (CA). 
199New Zealand Association of Inspectors in Schools & Education Officers & Pollock & Ors 
v Minister of Education & Director General of Education & New Zealand Public Service 
Association Inc [1990] NZILR 962. 
200Eg Clark v Housing Corporation of New Zealand Unreported, 17 August 1993, 
Employment Court, Wellington, WEC 19/93. The Court found that the employer had failed 
properly to exercise his discretion due to a misinterpretation, not of any statutory provision, 
but of the terms of the contract itself. 
201 For an analysis of the English cases see S Arrowsmith "Judicial Review and the 
Contractual Powers of Public Authorities" (1990) 106 LQR 277. 
202webster v Auckland Harbour Board [1983] NZLR 646, 650 (per Cooke & Jeffries JJ), 652 
(per McMullin J); above n 1 (Cooke P, Casey and Bisson JJ). Cooke P expressly incorporates 
his ealier joint judgment; Bisson J cites from it with approval. 
203Jt was held that as licensees of long standing the plaintiffs had a legitimate 
exf.ectation that they would be consulted about the price increase. 
20 Cannock Chase District Council v Kelly [1978]1 WLR l(CA). The tenant was defending 
~roceedings for possession of the property. 
05Budget Rent A Car Ltd v ARA above n 185. 
206[1985] 2 NZLR 378,382. 
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of Appeal found that a statutory powers had been exercised and the 
contract operated to restrict the exercise of the power.207 
The Court of Appeal took a different approach in the Stock Exchange case 
finding that a public body did not owe public law duties in relation to all 
its activities.208 Where a body entered into contracts in order to perform a 
statutory function, review of a decision to suspend the listing of a 
company's shares made pursuant to a term of the contract would not be 
available under the JAA. This case was followed by the Court of Appeal in 
Auckland Electric Power Board v Electricorp209 (on appeal to the Privy 
Council, Mercury Energy Limited v Electricity Corporation of New 
Zealand Ltd).210 The Court said that Electricorp's decision to terminate a 
commercial contract to supply services to AEPB (later Mercury Energy) was 
the commercial decision of a body incorporated under the Companies Act. 
The source of the power to terminate was the common law of contract and 
not the SOE Act. There had been no exercise of a statutory power and 
judicial review was not, therefore, available. 
The Privy Council disagreed with this analysis although it reached the 
same result. It found that an SOE is a public body 211 and the principles set 
out in Wednesbury 212 concerning the exercise of discretionary power 
applied to Electricorp when it exercised its discretion to terminate the 
supply contract.213 The Privy Council found that there was no basis for 
review as there was no evidence that Electricorp had acted in breach of 
these principles. Lord Templeman commented that Electricorp was 
empowered to operate the business of generating and distributing bulk 
electricity: the discretion to enter into and determine contracts was, 
therefore, its alone. 
The Privy Council indicated that review of "the decisions" of an SOE 
would be available either under the prerogative writs or the JAA. The 
SOE Act contains only broad empowering provisions. Thus on one 
reading Mercury suggests that where an Act confers a broad managerial 
role on a body all decisions made under powers conferred by contract are 
potentially capable of being reviewed both under the prerogative writs and 
the JAA.214 There is some support for this view from the approach of 
Lord Templeman in an earlier case.215 However, it is unclear that Mercury 
207 Above , 381. 
208New Zealand Stock Exchange v Listed Companies Association Inc [1984] 1 NZLR 699. 
209[1994] 1 NZLR 551. 
210Above n 159. 
211Above. 
2l2Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corpn [1947]2 All ER 680. 
213Above n 159,389: 
214Mai Chen adopts this interpretation. See Mai Chen "The Reconfiguration of the State 
and the Appropriate Scope for Judicial Review" in The State Under Contract above n 144, 
112, 115. 
21Ssee R v Basildon District Council, exp Brown (1981) 79 LGR 655 discussed in S 
Arrowsmith "Judicial Review and the Contractual Powers of Public Authorities" (1990) 106 
LQR 277,279. Note, however, that the case concerned termination of a license. 
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will be interpreted in this way. For example, the cases involving statutes 
conferring a broad managerial power involve bodies which bring to an 
end all the rights enjoyed under that contract: by termination on notice, 
cancellation of a license or a notice to quit as the case may be. 
Let us say, for example, that a contract entered into under managerial 
powers confers a discretion and expressly or impliedly indicates that 
certain factors are to be taken into account in the exercise of the discretion. 
The cases do not appear to suggest that judicial review would be available 
on the basis that the contract itself was a code and these matters were not 
taken into account by the decision-maker.216 That is, where a decision is 
made under a contract, the courts do not look to the terms of the contract 
itself to determine whether a decision made under it is illegal, irrational 
or unfair. They will look at whether the body has breached express or 
implied obligations contained in the statute; and in situations where a 
major right under the contract is infringed, or all the rights under the 
contract are removed, they seem prepared to review the decision on the 
other public law grounds. However, even this would seem unlikely 
where the contract itself provides the grounds upon which those rights 
can be terminated or the procedure to be followed. This is because in that 
event the court would have to look to the terms of the contract itself in 
order to assess the decision. This they are reluctant to do. 
Conclusions 
Extracting any clear principles from the cases is difficult. A persistent 
theme, however, is a failure217 to treat a contract as a regulatory code 
which can be reviewed in the same way as legislation. The underlying 
assumption is that a contract is a private bargain negotiated between the 
parties and that judicial review is inappropriate except in the limited 
circumstances discussed. 
The courts need to develop an analysis which considers the way in which 
the contract is being used. Where the contract is being used1a public body 
or a powerful private body as a regulatory tool judicial review may be 
appropriate. 
IX REVIEW OF THE DECISION-MAKERS UNDER THE RA TIN GS 
REGIME 
A Introduction 
In the following paragraphs I consider the potential for review of the 
decision-makers under the ratings regime. 
B The Registrar 
216£xcept the cases at above nn 198, 199 and 200. 
217Except above. 
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The Registrar of Companies is a statutory office holder218 It has a variety 
of roles under the Act: It is obliged to keep the necessary registers. More 
importantly, it is required to approve a rating agency or agencies on the 
recommendation of the Council. Prior to giving its approval it must 
ensure that the Council has consulted with non-member insurers and that 
an agreement has been entered into between the Council and the rating 
agency or agencies. 
The Registrar is thus a person who should be subject to judicial review 
under the traditional rationale219 and it clearly so subject under the case 
law which, as we have seen, continues to apply this rationale.220 
The Registrar carries out a routine role in the ratings regime except, 
possibly, in relation to approving the rating agencies. However, the Act 
appears to envisage that the Council selects the rating agencies as an 
insurer representative (it is one in relation to its members and must 
consult non-members) and using collective expertise. The scope for the 
Registrar to exercise any real power in the selection process, therefore, 
appears to be limited. In the event that an insurer refused to approve a 
recommended agency the Council could bring proceedings for judicial 
review of the Registrar's decision. The Court would have to consider the 
reasons for the Registrar's decision and whether it had acted illegally, 
irrationally or unfairly in corning to its decision. 
C The Insurance Council 
The Council is a self-regulatory incorporated association. There is, 
therefore, scope for review of its rules and decisions made under them 
pursuant to the non-governmental domestic body cases.221 Proceedings 
could be brought either seeking declaratory or injunctive relief or under 
the JAA.222 However, the scope for this type of review is limited and 
given the nature of the Council's rules223 is unlikely to provide any basis 
for relief in relation to the Council's decision made in performing its role 
in the ratings regime. 
Therefore, any scope for review must be found under the non-statutory 
"governmental" body cases.224 Whether a body performs public functions 
is a factor which can be taken into account.225 The Council plays a key role 
in a regime designed to benefit the public by providing them with 
218Except above. 
219see text above n 45. 
220 A case concerning judicial review of the Registrar is Coopers and Lybrand v Minister of 
Justice & Ors (1984) 2 NZCLC 99,199: The question there was whether the Registrar had 
exercised his powers of inspection for an improper purpose or had acted unfairly. 
221See text above n 166. 
2225ee text above n 182. 
2235ee text above n 48. 
224see text above n 149. 
225Datafin above n 154. 
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information to enable them to choose a solvent insurer. The ultimate 
purpose of the regime is to ensure that, in the event of a disaster, 
individuals and the public do not suffer due to the insolvency of an 
insurer or insurers. The Council is, therefore, performing a public 
function. The Council also exercises powers in a regime to which all 
insurers writing non-life insurance must submit. The exercise of 
monopoly powers is another factor suggesting that the Council is a body 
which should be reviewed. 
However, there must be some basis for finding that the role of the council 
is governmental.226 In its private role it exercises some power. But this 
power is augmented by the provisions of the regime. There is, therefore, 
sufficient "statutory underpinning" of its position to enable it to be 
reviewed under the principles set out in Datafin.227 The Council is, 
furthermore, a self-regulatory body like the Panel of Takeovers and 
Mergers in Datafin. 
Under the Ratings Act the Council recommends to the Registrar 
appropriate rating agencies.228 This recommendation effectively 
determines which agencies will perform the ratings. Such a 
recommendation can be reviewed under the prerogative writs and the 
JAA.229 
The Council has an express statutory obligation to consult with insurers 
who are not its members concerning the content of the Council/ Agency 
agreement. Its role as an insurer representative would create a legitimate 
expectation on the part of members that they will be similarly 
consulted. 230 
D The Rating Agencies 
The rating agencies perform the most important role under the ratings 
regime. They are private corporations. They operate by entering into 
contracts with individual clients. They are not bodies which regulate an 
area of activity by applying rules. There is, thus no basis for reviewing 
their decisions under the non-statutory domestic body cases.231 
I turn now to whether they can be reviewed under the non-statutory 
"governmental" body cases. The agencies are exercising a public function 
for the reasons set out earlier in relation to the Council. The question is 
whether there is a sufficient degree of statutory underpinning of their 
226 Above and see cases at nn 159 to 164. 
227 Above n 154. 
228The Ratings Act, s 17. 
229see R v Electricity Commissioners, ex p London Electricity Joint Committee Company 
(1920) Ltd & Ors (1924] 1 KB 171 at 192 (per Bankes LJ) and 208 (per Aitkin LJ). Bradley v 
Attorney-General (1988] 2 NZLR 454, 467. 
2305ee eg CCSU above n 1; Webster above n 1. 
231See text n 166. 
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position for them to be classified as governmental in relation to their role 
under the Ratings Act. In Datafin232 the underpinning arose because the 
Panel's powers were enhanced by statutory measures which fitted around 
the role performed by the Panel.233 The agencies are in much the same 
position. Absent their role under the Ratings Act they are simply 
corporations performing a service for a fee and which exercise a degree of 
power due to their reputations and their commercial practices, in 
particular wide publicising of their ratings. By virtue of the Ratings Act, 
however, virtually all insurers writing non-life business must obtain 
ratings from them: they exercise a duopoly of power in relation to the 
regulation of such insurers in New Zealand. 
In the Lloyd's and Insurance Ombudsman cases234 the English High Court 
found that bodies with a degree of statutory underpinning would not be 
reviewable due to contracts with the party seeking review. There is clearly 
a risk that these authorities would be followed given the tendency of the 
cases following Datafin to read down that decision.235 Furthermore, the 
rating agencies are private corporations rather than self-regulatory 
organisations. This, too, may be used as a reason for distinguishing 
Datafin. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the Lloyd's and Insurance 
Ombudsman cases misinterpret the earlier authorities refer which to sole 
jurisdiction and not any jurisdiction conferred by contract.236 There are, 
furthermore, other cases which, although not so thoroughly argued, 
suggest that a body which is so underpinned and exercises powers under 
contract may be reviewed.237 There is also a basis for distinguishing the 
Lloyd's case. Lloyd's, unlike the rating agencies, does not regulate the 
whole insurance market and this was a factor in the Court's decision to 
decline relief.238 The Insurance Ombudsman case is more difficult to 
distinguish: there the body was one of two which could exercise a 
complaints function recognised by the Financial Services Act (UK) and the 
Court found, therefore, that submission to its jurisdiction was voluntary 
and judicial review unavailable. This argument could be used in relation 
to the rating agencies. 
In summary, an argument can be constructed to the effect that the rating 
agencies are bodies capable of review. A more difficult question is which 
of their decisions are reviewable. Although their power is, in part, 
derived from the Ratings Act, their role is set out in the agency /insurer 
agreements. 
232see above n 154. 
233see text above n 156. 
234Above n 196. 
235 Above n 154. 
236See text above n 155. 
237See cases above nn 198, 199 and 200. 
238L[oyd's above n 196, 185. 
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The sorts of decisions of which review may be sought are as follows. First, 
an insurer may maintain that the agency has failed to take into account 
criteria or failed to apply the methodology set out in the agreement. Or 
the agency may have taken into account criteria not set out in the 
agreement. The agency may be poised to issue a credit watch warning 
which the insurer regards as completely unjustified (one which no 
reasonable rating agency could reach). In relation to a rating, the agency 
may have failed to give the insurer an opportunity to comment on the 
draft rating as required by the agreement.239 Or the insurer may wish to 
argue that it should be given an opportunity to comment on a credit watch 
warning before it is issued. These are all the sorts of situation which 
judicial review has developed to cope with. Proceedings for breach of 
contract are unlikely to provide the sort of relief required. For example, 
the insurer may wish to obtain an order quashing a decision so it is not 
obliged to register the rating.240 
If the cases recognised that the agreement was, in effect, a regulation then 
the position would be relatively straightforward. The cases concerning 
Self Regulatory Organisations241 could form the basis for such an 
argument as could the employment case referred to.242 A decision of the 
Labour Court243 said that an collective employment agreement registered 
under the Labour Relations Act 1987 had quasi regulatory status so that a 
decision made under it could be reviewed. This status derived not just 
from the fact of registration but also because the Labour Relations Act 
provided that the agreement was binding on the parties, members of the 
union and those engaged in the industry to which the agreement 
applied. 244 It can be argued, therefore, that the Ratings Act confers 
regulatory status on the schedule to the agency/ council agreement which 
is deemed to form part of the agency /insurer agreements.245 On the other 
hand an English employment case has taken an opposite point of view.246 
In summary, there is an argument to the effect that the agreements have 
quasi statutory status but it is by no means certain of success. 
If this argument failed the insurer challenging the decision could argue 
that Mercury247 allows it to challenge decisions made by a public body 
under a contract on public law grounds. The difficulties here are 
illustrated by considering each of the decisions which could be challenged. 
First a rating decision by an agency which failed to take into account the 
rating criteria. The criteria are set out in the agreement, not in the statute 
and the cases do not support that a decision could be challenged on the 
239See part V. 
240under the Ratings Act, ss 5 & 6. 
241Above n 198. 
242Above n 200. 
243New Zealand Association of Inspectors in Schools above n 199. 
244See ss 82 and 83 of the Labour Relations Act 1987 (now repealed). See also Bell 
(Inspector of Awards & Agreements v Broadley Downs Ltd [1987] NZILR 959 (CA). 
245Ratings Act, s 19(2). 
246R v East Berkshire Health Authority, ex p Walsh [1985] 1 QB 152. 
247See above n 159. 
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grounds of illegality in such a case.248 The way round this argument 
would be that s 19(1)(a) of the Ratings Act impliedly requires that such 
criteria be taken into account by the agency.249 
Turning then to a decision to issue a credit watch warning. This is entirely 
in the discretion of the rating agency. Does the decision in Mercury then 
allow the court to review this decision or is it restricted to terminations of 
agreements? The same question can be asked in relation to decisions 
made to issue ratings credit watch warnings where the insurer is of the 
view that it has had insufficient opportunity to comment. The answer, in 
my view, is probably no for the reasons expressed earlier.250 
E Conclusions 
The decisions of the Council can be reviewed and it is arguable that the 
decisions of the rating agencies can be reviewed. More significantly, the 
application of the case law to the ratings regime illustrates how inadequate 
it is to deal with a pluralist form of regulation. 
X CONCLUSIONS 
The State is not unitary and is better described as a species of market-
oriented pluralism. Developments in New Zealand since 1984 are 
evidence that the organisation of the State in general is now along these 
lines. The conception and implementation of the Ratings Regime is an 
example. The two significant features of the regime are first, that it 
employs private bodies and secondly, that it uses contract as a regulatory 
tool. 
Judicial review is premised on the unitary state which ties judicial review 
to governmental bodies and is chary of rules which are in the nature of 
contracts. Proceedings for judicial review of powerful non-statutory 
regulatory bodies has generally resulted in one of two outcomes. Either it 
is found that judicial review is unavailable because the body is "private" 
or the courts have strained the concept of government power in order to 
grant review. The result is conceptual confusion and a body of 
contradictory case law which is difficult to apply. New principles need to 
be developed by the courts which recognise first, that society is pluralist 
and secondly, that contract is frequently used as a regulatory tool. The 
difficulties which arise have been illustrated in relation to the ratings 
regime which is a pluralist form of regulation. 
24Bsee part VIII. 
249See Webster above n 1. 
250See text above n 216. 
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